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Introduction 
The Niger Delta region, Nigeria’s oil belt, has been the site of a 
generalized ethnic and regional struggle for self-determination since 
1998. It has been the location of often violent confrontations 
between local ethnic communities and agents of the Nigerian state 
and oil companies involved in the extraction and exploitation of oil 
in the area. What began as community agitation has undoubtedly 
undergone several transformations. The first involved the flowering 
of civil societies, which mobilized a popular civil struggle. The 
second saw the extension of the agitation against multinational oil 
companies and the federal government. The third transformation 
involved the elevation of the agitation from purely developmental 
issues to political demands such as restructuring of the federal 
system, resource control and the resolution of the national question 
through a conference of ethnic nationalities. The current and fourth 
stage of the transformation has seen the entrance of youths, youth 
militancy, and youth militias with volatile demands and ultimatums 
that have accentuated the scale and intensity of confrontations and 
violence with the multinationals and the federal government 
(Eghosa, Augustine, Omobolaji, & Okhonmina, 2007, p.2).   
 After appraising the situation of human rights abuse in the 
oil producing regions of Nigeria, the Human Rights Watch came to 
the conclusion that the oil companies and the communities they 
operate in occupy different worlds, geographically overlapping but 
conceptually light years apart. The oil companies see themselves as 




carrying out a legitimate business, which makes a major 
contribution to the Nigerian economy. They regret, at least 
officially, the lack of true democracy in Nigeria, the abuses carried 
out against the oil producing communities by the security forces and 
the failure of the Nigerian government to spend the oil wealth 
wisely, in particular in the oil producing communities themselves. 
They, however, represent these problems as having essentially 
nothing to do with the commercial companies that produce the oil. 
 Nevertheless, as a gesture of goodwill, as they would see it, 
and in partial recognition of the deficiencies of the Nigerian 
government, they invest substantial amounts of money in 
development projects in the communities where they operate. While 
they admit there are some negative environmental consequences of 
oil production, the oil companies argue that these are both 
exaggerated and in any event entirely outweighed by the benefits 
they bring. Despite this contribution, oil company managers state 
that they operate in Nigeria in a thankless, even hostile political 
environment. Although their relations with the federal government 
have recently improved, they still face difficulties in obtaining 
payment of the sums due to them under their joint ventures.  
Furthermore, oil company personnel see no reason why they 
should answer to the communities in which they work when they are 
simply carrying out their normal activities, for which they have 
received government licenses. They view community protests as 
unrealistic demands on them to take on responsibilities that are 
properly the domain of the government; protests which at times 
amount to simply criminal extortion, sabotage or intimidation 
(HRW, 1999, p.79). For the communities, on the other hand, the oil 
companies and their contractors are often the most visible 
manifestation of central government in their areas. They know that 
oil companies are operating joint ventures with the government; 
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they see the oil installations guarded by federal police or soldiers, 
and the rapid response from the federal or state government if there 
is any threat to oil production. They draw the conclusion that the oil 
companies and government are so closely linked as to be effectively 
the same thing, an idea backed by the government’s own comments.  
Accordingly, they make their demands for greater revenue 
allocation to the delta as well as for compensation for the damage 
wrought by oil production of the oil companies as they do of the 
government, and blame the oil companies as they do the government 
for the repression with which their demands are met. The 
communities are well aware that the oil companies are making large 
profits out of what they see as ‘their’ oil, and believe that these 
profits bring with them responsibilities towards the traditional 
landholders. At the same time, they see that a few individuals in their 
communities, the contractors, traditional rulers and liaison 
representatives have profited handsomely from oil production, 
during the same period that the land has become less fertile and fish 
catches declined. Communities want compensation for loss of 
livelihood caused by land expropriations, oil spills and other effects 
of oil production, yet they find themselves with no meaningful way 
of obtaining an independent determination of their loss.  
Therefore, there can be no solution to the simmering conflict 
in the oil producing areas of the delta until its people gain 
the right to participate in their own governance and until the 
protection of the rule of law is extended to their 
communities. The injustices facing the peoples of the delta 
are in many ways the same as those facing all Nigerians after 
decades of successive military regimes, yet in the oil 
producing regions the suppression of political activity, the 
lack of legal redress for damage to the environment and the 




resulting loss of livelihood, and sheer ubiquity of human 
rights abuses by the region’s security forces have generated 
greater protests, in turn generating greater repression 
(Human Rights Watch, 1999, p.202).  
Ethnic agitation in Nigeria’s political history dates as far back as the 
period before the country’s independence. However, this chapter 
focuses on the agitation of the people of the Niger Delta, with a 
particular interest on the Ijaw ethnic grouping. Ethnic nationalism 
among the Ijaw can be conveniently situated within the context of 
Joireman’s thesis of a “coincidence of ethnicity and a lack of 
economic prosperity”: 
A history of unequal development in a country in 
which the regional inequalities coincide with 
ethnicity can establish the precipitating factors for 
ethnic conflict. It can give a group of people a 
legitimate grievance that over time can escalate into 
ethnic conflict (2004, p.12). 
This essentially captures the basis of the ethnic agitation in the Niger 
Delta against the Nigerian state. It is essential for this study to situate 
this scenario in proper historical perspective for a clearer 
understanding of the conflict situation in the region. Successive 
governments have misspent the oil wealth which the oil companies 
have helped to unlock, salting it away in foreign bank accounts 
rather than investing in education, health, and other social sectors, 
and mismanaging the national economy to the point of collapse. At 
the community level, the companies are faced with increasing 
protests directed at oil company activities and the lack of 
development in the delta; these have included incidents of hostage-
taking, closures of flow stations, sabotage, and intimidation of staff. 
And all these have been used as raw materials for film production 
by Nigeria’s Nollywood. 
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Oil Industry and the Oil Producing Communities 
Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa and the fifth largest in 
the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The 
discovery of oil has transformed Nigeria’s political economy, and 
oil has for many decades provided more than 90% of foreign 
exchange earnings and 80% of federal revenue (HRW, 1999, p.26). 
Nigeria also has huge reserves of natural gas yet to be fully 
exploited. Yet, instead of turning Nigeria into one of the most 
prosperous states on the African continent, these natural resources 
have enriched a small minority while the vast majority has become 
increasingly impoverished. With a per capita gross national product 
of only $260 per year, Nigeria is one of the poorest countries in the 
world (UNDP, 2009). At the same time, the struggle among the elite 
to gain access to the profits of the oil boom has been a major factor 
in the rule of successive military governments.  
 Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has been plagued by a 
succession of military rules. While minority ethnic groups in 
Nigeria’s multi-ethnic federation have successfully demanded that 
new states and local government units be carved out to fulfil their 
hopes of receiving some benefit from the oil money and to 
compensate for damage done by oil production, the Nigerian 
federation has in practice, paradoxically, become ever more 
centralized, and power and money have been concentrated in the 
hands of fewer and fewer people. Politics has become an exercise in 
organized corruption; a corruption perhaps most spectacularly 
demonstrated around the oil industry itself, where large 
commissions and percentage cuts of contracts have enriched 
individuals. 




 Oil production has had damaging effects on the environment 
of the oil producing region, though the extent of the damage is 
subject to dispute. The Niger Delta is one of the world’s largest 
wetlands, and the largest in Africa. It encompasses over 20,000sq 
kilometres of which perhaps 6,000 square kilometres is mangrove 
forest, and has high biodiversity typical of extensive swamp and 
forest areas with many unique species of plants and animals. Despite 
decades of oil production, there is surprisingly little good quality 
independent scientific data on the overall or long term effects of 
hydrocarbon pollution on the delta, yet oil led development has 
clearly seriously damaged the environment and the livelihood of 
many of those living in the oil producing communities. The oil 
companies operating in Nigeria maintain that their activities are 
conducted to the highest environmental standards; but Nigerian 
environmental laws are poorly enforced. 
 While the people of the Niger Delta have faced the adverse 
effects of oil extraction, they have in general also failed to gain from 
the oil wealth. The people living in the oil producing communities 
do not belong to the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria 
(Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, Yoruba), and speak a diverse range of 
languages and dialects; the largest of these groups are the Ijaw who 
collectively form Nigeria’s fourth largest ethnic group. Since the 
creation of the Nigerian state by the British, the peoples of the delta 
have complained of marginalization by the regional and federal 
governments who have ruled their affairs. Despite the vast wealth 
produced from the oil found under the delta, the region remains 
poorer than the national average; and though in the northern part of 
Nigeria poverty is more extreme, the division between rich and poor 
are more obvious in the areas where gas flares light up the sky 
(HRW, 1999, p. 202). 
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Protests and Repression in Oil Producing Communities 
The Niger Delta has proved to be the pivotal point where all of 
Nigeria’s plagues of political gangsterism, corruption, and poverty 
seem to converge. Amidst the theatre and drama of masked militants 
lay an insurgency in which bitter men are engaged in a ferocious 
struggle to end oppression and exploitation by the federal 
government of Nigeria. Virtually every oil-producing community 
has experienced an incident along the following lines: Community 
members stage a protest demanding compensation for oil company 
activities (often stated to have been promised in prior agreements) 
in the form of cash, development projects, or employment, or calling 
for environmental clean-up. In response to the protest, members of 
the Mobile Police or other security forces come to the scene; the 
security forces carry out indiscriminate beatings, arrests and 
detention; the protest is then abandoned. In some cases, oil 
companies apparently responded to the demands to some extent, in 
others, they have been ignored.  
 In March 1997, youths captured a barge delivering goods to 
a Chevron installation. The crew of seventy Nigerians and 
twenty expatriates were held hostage for three days by youth 
demanding jobs on the vessel. Following negotiations in 
which money was paid to the protesters, the barge was 
allowed to go offshore; the navy then boarded it and rescued 
the hostages. 
 In August 1997, the Iyokiri community in Rivers State 
blocked access to SPDC employees seeking to repair a leak, 
demanding that compensation be paid first; as a result, three 
flow stations were closed for several days. 
 In September 1997, the 10,000 bpd Diebu flow station in 
Bayelsa State was closed for several weeks as a result of a 




dispute with the Peremabiri community, which was 
demanding compensation for fishing nets damaged by an oil 
spill in June of the same year. 
 In October 1997, the Odeama flow station in Bayelsa State 
was closed for several days by youths demanding that fifty 
of them be employed by SPDC. 
 In October 1997, youths in Gelegele village, near Warri, 
Delta State, halted production for several days at a well 
yielding up to 2,000 bpd operated by Dubri Oil Company, 
an indigenous Nigerian operator. The youths were protesting 
the effect of gas flaring on their village. 
 In November 1997, Nigerian opposition radio reported that 
about 3,000 people from Ekakpamre village near Ughelli in 
Delta state had forced the closure of Ughelli West flow 
station for several days, demanding N20million 
compensation for encroachment on their land, a new access 
road and other projects. 
 From November 25 to December 23, 1997, Tunu and 
Opukoshi flow stations, together pumping 80,000bpd, were 
closed by villagers, forcing Shell to declare on December 19 
that it would be unable to meet all commitments on time at 
its Forcados terminal from December 21, to January 11. 
 From December 13 to December 17, 1997, thirteen 
employees of Western Geophysical were held hostage by 
youths in a barge off the coast of Ondo state. 
 Odeama Creek flow station was closed for several days in 
January 1998 by youths demanding environmental tests, a 
reduction of gas flaring, clean water supply and other 
projects. 
 From January 20, 1998, Texaco’s offshore Funiwa platform 
was occupied for about one week by youths from the 
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neighboring Koluama community, shutting in about 
55,000bpd. 
 In March 1998, SPDC reported that it had shut in 200,000 
bpd at its Tora manifold in the Nembe area, after youths had 
protested; calling for compensation, jobs and development 
projects. 
 From April 28 to May 11, 1998, Shell’s flow stations at 
Odidi and Egwa in Delta State were closed by protesting 
youths 
 From May 25 to June 2, 1998, youths occupied Chevron’s 
Parabe Platform, offshore from Ondo State, and held 
workers hostage. 
In many cases, oil companies describe protests by local youths as 
purely criminal in purpose, aimed at extorting benefits to which they 
are not entitled from the oil industry. These same incidents are 
described by the youths involved as a fight for their rights. 
According to Chevron, for example, “In some cases, the youths 
simply try to extort money from personnel working on barges and 
drilling rigs without reason or based on some fabricated excuse.” 
Thus, “Because of the level of poverty in most of the remote areas, 
there are… many cases of unscrupulous claims for compensation for 
damages that cannot be substantiated” (HRW, 2008, p.139). While 
Chevron identifies the disproportion between the wealth of the oil 
company and the poverty of the oil producing areas as an important 
contributor to conflict, it sees the protests that result as criminal 
only. The youths who make what Chevron describes as 
‘unscrupulous’ claims put it differently: “We have committed 
ourselves to the fight against environmental degradation, social and 
economic injustice in our land. Chevron pays soldiers to kill us and 




has bribed the police to keep us away; when we demand our rights, 
they just send the Mobile Police” (HRW, 2008, p.139).  
 The story of Oloibiri, which has been described as the 
‘ground zero’ of Nigeria’s oil exploration and exploitation activities, 
is even more pathetic than others. In the 1960s (the hay days of 
Oloibiri) the town had a population of about 10,000. It is now a 
wretched backwater, a sort of rural slum, home to barely 1,000 souls 
who might as well live in another century. No running water, no 
electricity, no roads, and no functioning primary school; the creeks 
have been so heavily dredged, canalized, and polluted that 
traditional rural livelihood has been eviscerated. Oloibiri’s intimate 
association with oil contains another crucial lesson: It was in 
Oloibiri that Isaac Adaka Boro, an Ijaw nationalist and leader of the 
Niger Delta Volunteer Service was born in 1938. Declaring an 
independent Niger Delta Republic on February 24, 1966, in the 
wake of Nigeria’s first and bloody military coup that ousted the first 
republic; Boro’s famous ‘Twelve Day Revolution’ was a foretaste 
of what was to come a few decades later as the abandonment and 
despoliation felt so harshly by Oloibiri was replicated with terrifying 
fidelity across the Niger Delta oil fields. Boro’s immediate 
successors in the struggle for self-determination and resource 
control were Ken Saro Wiwa and the Ogoni people.  The rise of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) during a 
brutal moment in Nigeria’s sad parade of military governments 
ended with arrest, trial by a kangaroo court, conviction and hanging 
of Saro Wiwa and eight others in November 1995. Saro Wiwa’s 
charismatic leadership spawned a raft of other ethnic nationality 
movements among the Ijaw, the Isoko, Itshekiri and Urhobo. As 
Saro Wiwa predicted and feared, the nonviolent struggle turned into 
violent struggle as the conditions across the oil fields remained not 
just the same, but even worse. Security forces still operated with 
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impunity, the government failed to protect communities in oil 
producing areas while providing security to the oil industry, and the 
oil companies bore responsibility too for the appalling misery and 
the political violence across the region. 
 But even Saro Wiwa’s gravest fears could not have 
anticipated the calamitous descent into violence over the years, 
culminating with the dramatic appearance of the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) in 2005. MEND claims 
to be a “Union of all relevant militant groups” (Watts, 2008, p.38). 
Beginning with a massive attack on the Opobo pipeline in Delta 
State in December 2005, MEND subsequently destroyed the 
offshore Forcados loading platform, the Ekeremore – Yeye 
manifold, and the state oil company Escravos-Lagos gas pipeline in 
Chanom Creek. Between January 2006 and March 2007, the bitter 
men of MEND, who were neither communists nor revolutionaries, 
had taken 200 expatriate oil workers hostages and attacked 42 oil 
installations. Within a period of one-year MEND almost succeeded 
in paralyzing the oil industry in Nigeria. The International Herald 
Tribune painted a vivid picture: 
Companies now confine employees to heavily fortified 
compounds, allowing them to travel only by armoured car or 
helicopter…. One company has outfitted bathrooms with 
steel bolts to turn them into ‘panic’ room, if needed. Another 
has coated the pylons of a giant oil-production platform 
130kms, or 80miles offshore with waterproof grease to 
prevent attackers from climbing the rig….  Some foreign 
operators have abandoned oil fields, or left the country 
altogether. ‘I can’t think of anything worse right now,’ said 
Larry Johnson, a former U.S. Army officer who was recently 
hired to toughen security at a Nigerian site operated by Eni, 




an Italian oil producer. Even Angola during the civil war 
wasn’t this bad (as cited in Watts, 2008, p.38) 
 It is estimated that by November 2007, oil revenue was down by 
40%. Shell alone, the largest oil operator, accounting for almost half 
of oil output had lost over 10billion dollars. By any estimation, the 
costs of this oil insurgency were vast. A report prepared for NNPC 
published in 2003, titled “Back from the Brink” painted a very 
gloomy risk audit for the Delta. NNPC estimated that between 1998 
and 2003, there were 400 vandalizations on company facilities each 
year; oil losses amounted to over 1billion dollars annually. By 2003, 
750,000b/d were shut in as a result of attacks on oil installations, and 
beginning in April 2004 another wave of violence erupted, this time 
triggered by ethnic militia. Ateke Tom (leader of the Niger Delta 
Vigilante) and Asari Dokubo (leader of the Niger Delta People’s 
Volunteer Force), each funded in part by their control of oil 
bunkering trade, sprung to life during the 2003 elections along the 
Port Harcourt – Okirika – Kalabari axis, employed as political thugs 
and armed by local politicians.  
  The Niger Delta’s long festering crisis is nourished by a 
gigantic reservoir of anger and dissent. The reality on the ground is a 
dizzying and bewildering array of colourfully named militants and 
militant group and cults. Over fifty operating military camps were at 
one time dotted around the creeks. The fact on ground is that there 
was overwhelming popular sympathy for what the militants were 
doing. Watts claims that some of his sources estimate that the number 
of trained militants operating in the creeks was over 25,000 
commanding monthly salaries of over N50,000, well above the wage 
that might be secured by an educated youth employed in the formal 
sector. The disturbing question remains, “How did what began with 
wild cotters and compo officials preaching the virtues of oil to chiefs 
and traditional diviners in Oloibiri culminate in car bombs, rocket 
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propelled grenades, and counter insurgency?” (Watt, 2008, pp.38-
39). 
 
Suppression of Demands for Compensation 
During June and July 1995, there were major disturbances in 
Egbema, Imo State, after youths demonstrated against Shell, 
demanding among other issues, the installation of a gas turbine to 
supply electricity for the community. The police responded 
violently to this protest by carrying out indiscriminate beatings and 
arrests and using teargas freely. Many were beaten who were not 
involved in the protest but were simply passers-by. More than thirty 
people were arrested, of whom about eight were women, and some 
were teenagers. They were detained at Owerri for one to three 
weeks, and charged with sabotage, though the case later adjourned 
indefinitely. A number of Mobile Police remained stationed in the 
community for several months (HRW, 1999, p.139). 
 On August 24, 1995, conflict between a Shell contractor and 
a local community over employment opportunities led to the killing 
of a teacher at Iko, Akwa Ibom State. There had been serious 
disturbances in Iko in 1987, when Mobile Police had burnt forty 
houses to the ground following a protest against Shell, and in 1995 
the village of Iko was still badly affected by a malfunctioning flare 
which was flooded by salt water at high tide, allowing salt from sea 
water to be vaporized and shot out over the village, killing 
vegetation and corroding metal roofing sheets. In August 1995, 
Western Geophysical, a seismic survey company, came to the 
nearby Utapete flow station, close to the Atlantic coast, to carry out 
a three-dimensional survey on behalf of SPDC. According to 
community members, the company was approached to seek 
employment for local people in carrying out the survey; villagers 




reported to Human Right swatch that representatives of Western 
Geophysical accordingly came to the village accompanied by a 
number of naval officers and negotiations took place with 
community leaders in the chief’s house. Eyewitnesses described 
how, sometime after the Western Geophysical representatives had 
left, a detachment of Mobile Police came to the community, fired 
teargas and beat people at random. During this incident, a school 
teacher from the village, Emmanuel Nelson, who had been 
interpreting during the meeting, was beaten to death. Up to twenty 
people were detained, beaten, and put in police vehicles, although 
they were released at the next village, on the appeal of two senior 
members of the community (HRW, 1999, p.143).  
 In September 1995, a youth from Elele, Rivers where Elf 
operates several wells, went to speak to Saipem, a Contractor for 
Elf, on behalf of his family on whose land one of Elf’s well was 
located. The family believed that, since land had been taken for the 
operation of oil production, they should be compensated in some 
way for any new activity on the land and the youth was delegated to 
make representation on their behalf. The public relations 
representative for Saipem told the youth that he should go to speak 
to Elf; but while the meeting was going on, three soldiers came to 
the caravan where the meeting was taking place and took the youth 
to the nearby military cantonment, where he was detained two days 
and severely beaten. When he was released he spent two weeks in 
hospital (1999, p.154). 
 In early 1996, a spillage took place at Uheri, Isoko Local 
Government area, Delta State, for which compensation was agreed. 
There was a delay in payment – according to Shell, this was because 
there was a need to ‘clarify duplicated claims by various groups in 
the community’ – and a number of youths protested at the flow 
station, telling the workers there to stop production. Federal police 
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came from the divisional police station and arrested six of the dozen 
youths involved, held them overnight at the police station and 
released them the next day. According to Shell, the spill was 
reported to Idu Amadi, chair of the local government authority, who 
requested the intervention of the police, apparently because he was 
irritated and embarrassed by the youths’ failure to dialogue with 
SPDC (p. 160). 
  In January, 1997, over one hundred youths held a 
demonstration at SPDC’s Ahia Flow Station, Omudioga, in Rivers 
State. The youths demanded that Shell should carry out development 
projects in their village, including tarring the road, completing a 
water project and providing electricity; a tarred road currently leads 
to the flow station, but bypasses the village (understandably 
annoying local residents); a water project had been begun but not 
completed, and electricity poles had been erected, but no cables 
were attached. The youths went to the flow station, demanded that 
the staff there close down production, and occupied the site. About 
fifteen members of the Rivers State Internal Security Task Force 
came to the flow station and arrested twelve of the youths. They 
were taken to Bori Camp in Port Harcourt and detained for one 
month; for the first five days they were beaten every morning, and 
teargas canisters were fired into their cell on a number of occasions. 
They were eventually released without charge, with a warning that 
they should not hold any protests about development projects or they 
would be detained again (p.155). 
 In July, 1997, ten youths from Edagberi, Rivers State, were 
detained for a day at Ahoada police station. They had gone to Alcon 
Engineering, a contractor for SPDC, demanding that Alcon provide 
diesel for the community, in accordance with an agreement that they 
understood to have been made with the company as compensation 




for the disturbance caused by the operations in the community. 
According to Shell, no such agreement existed, although there had 
been an agreement for the provision of an electricity project (p.145). 
 On September 21, 1998, several thousand women from Egi 
community in Rivers State demonstrated at Elf’s nearby Obite gas 
project, protesting the actions of security officers at the facility, 
demanding the release of an environmental impact assessment for 
the project, and calling for social investment in the community. A 
confrontation ensued between youths of the community and Mobile 
Police based at the site, during which youths destroyed property at 
the site, while one youth was stabbed and severely wounded, and 
twenty-one detained. The twenty-one were held without charge until 
a local human rights organisation applied to court, and they were 
charge and released on bail. A meeting was subsequently held with 
representatives of Elf, at which the demands were again presented. 
On November 23, a larger women’s demonstration was held, with 
the same demands (HRW, 1999, p.151). 
 On December 30, 1998, Ijaw youths protesting against the 
oil companies and in support of the ‘Kaiama Declaration’ adopted 
on December 11, 1998, demonstrated in Yenagoa, and several other 
locations across the delta, calling on the multinational oil companies 
to withdraw from Ijaw territories, ‘pending the resolution of the 
issue of resource ownership and control’ (see Appendix C). 
Thousands of troops and navy personnel were brought into the 
region in response to these protests. In Yenagoa, at least seven 
youths were reported to have been shot dead by security forces on 
December 30, and another sixteen the following day in nearby 
communities (HRW, 1999, p.153). 
 
The Case of Umuechem 
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On October 30 and 31, 1990, a protest took place at Shell’s facility 
at Umuechem, east of Port Harcourt, Rivers State, which led to the 
police killing some eighty unarmed demonstrators and destroying or 
badly damaging 495 houses. This incident was the first to bring the 
situation in the Niger Delta to international attention according to 
Human Rights Watch (1999, p. 123).  
 Youths from Umuechem community demanded provisions 
of electricity, water, roads and other compensations for oil pollution 
of crops and water supplies. On October 29, 1990, the Divisional 
Manager, SPDC Eastern Division, had written to the Rivers State 
Commissioner of Police to request security protection, with 
preference for the paramilitary Mobile Police, in anticipation of an 
impending attack on SPDC facilities in Umuechem, allegedly 
planned for the following morning. Following peaceful protests by 
village youths on SPDC’s premises on October 30, SPDC again 
made a written report to the Governor of Rivers State, a copy of 
which was sent to the Commissioner of Police. On October, 31, 
Mobile Police attacked peaceful demonstrators with teargas and 
gunfire. They returned at 5 a.m. the next day, shooting 
indiscriminately, in a purported attempt to locate three of their 
members who had not returned the previous evening.  
 A judicial commission of inquiry established by the 
government found no evidence of a threat by the villagers and 
concluded that the Mobile Police had displayed a reckless disregard 
for lives and property. No compensation was awarded for the attack 
to those whose relatives were killed or homes destroyed, nor have 
the perpetrators been brought to justice (HRW, 1999, p.124). 
 
 
The Case of Ogoniland  




The most significant effort to target oil production in an attempt to 
highlight minority grievances has been that led by the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), founded in 1990 by the 
leaders of the Ogoni ethnic group, including Ken Saro-Wiwa. In 
August 1990, MOSOP adopted an “Ogoni Bill of Rights,” which 
listed the grievances of the Ogoni people and demanded ‘political 
autonomy to participate in the affairs of the federal republic as a 
distinct and separate unit,’ including ‘the right to the control and use 
of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources for Ogoni 
development’ (see Appendix B). In October 1990, MOSOP sent the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights to the then head of state, Ibrahim Babangida, 
but received no response. In December 1992, MOSOP sent its 
demands to Shell, Chevron, and NNPC, the partners in the joint 
ventures operating in Ogoni, together with an ultimatum to pay back 
royalties and compensation within thirty days or quit Ogoniland.  
 On January 4, 1993, at the start of the UN’s International 
Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, MOSOP held a mass rally 
in Ogoni attended by hundreds of thousands of people. Mobilisation 
continued throughout the year, and MOSOP decided 
controversially, to boycott the June 12, 1993 elections. Shell 
withdrew its staff from Ogoni and ceased production at its facilities. 
This demonstration of organised political opposition to both 
government and oil companies resulted in a military crackdown in 
Ogoni. Ken Saro-Wiwa and other MOSOP leaders were detained 
several times during 1993. A Rivers State Internal Security Task 
Force, a military unit, was created in January 1994 specifically to 
deal with the Ogoni crisis. In May 1994, there was a brutal murder 
by a mob of youths of four prominent Ogoni leaders, who had been 
associated with a faction of MOSOP that had differed with Saro- 
Wiwa on the organisation’s tactics and strategy, and had been 
regarded by some in MOSOP as government collaborators. Ken 
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Saro-Wiwa and several other Ogoni activists were immediately 
arrested in connection with the four murders, despite a lack of 
credible evidence to connect them to the deaths. Sixteen members 
of the MOSOP leadership were put on trial for the May 1994 
murders, and nine, including Ken Saro-Wiwa were eventually 
convicted and sentenced to death by a special tribunal established 
for the case, whose procedures blatantly violated international 
standards of due process: 
The judgment of the Tribunal is not merely wrong, illogical 
or perverse. It is downright dishonest. The Tribunal 
consistently advanced arguments which no experienced 
lawyer could possibly believe to be logical or just. I believe 
that the Tribunal first decided its verdicts and then sought for 
arguments to justify them. No barrel was too deep to be 
scraped (as cited in HRW, 2008, p.125). 
Without the right to an appeal, the ‘Ogoni Nine’ were executed 
on November 10, 1995.  
 
Oil Politics and the Niger Delta Ethnic Nationalism Films   
The actual history of oil is one of violence, brute force, and the worst 
excesses of frontier capitalism. This is very much the case in the 
Niger Delta region of Nigeria. The study of the Niger Delta ethnic 
nationalism agitations and youth militancy needs to be viewed in 
economic and political terms, as a major profit oriented venture. 
Looking at the situation through the filter of ‘profitism’ and 
capitalism will allow us see why the region appears to be trapped in 
a treacherous sea of petro-violence; perhaps, a clear vision will also 
pave way for a possible solution. The films that re-enact the 
agitations in the Niger Delta provide insight into this profits and 
capitalism as the bug of selfish interests appears to have caught 




people at all levels of the society within and outside government. A 
critical reading of the Niger Delta ethnic nationalism films helps us 
situate the politics of oil within a reasonable ambience as we move 
from community politics of self-aggrandizement to the national 
politics of power brokerage and selfish interests, all motivated and 
fuelled by the wealth of the Niger Delta region. 
Nnimmo Bassey (2008, p.90) describes oil as a cheap source 
of energy; cheap because the cost of oil extraction, especially in the 
Niger Delta, is not reflected in the price at the pump. One 
consequence of the unfettered and reckless exploration and 
exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta is that the poor people continue 
to subsidize the cost of crude oil through the losses they suffer in 
environmental services, quality of life, and extreme environmental 
degradation. In turn, opportunistic groups (oil bunkerers, gangs, 
militants, etc.) find space to extract and extort financial gains from 
the system. This brings about the assertion that Nigeria suffers from 
a “resource curse.” But oil should be a blessing, not a curse. 
Resource wealth need not subvert development. It is the scramble 
for the wealth that produces the pillaging of the public sector by 
private interests in their violent struggle for oil rents.  
To put it this way privileges one set of local actors: the 
state/political elites, militia groups/warlords, and weak and inept 
bureaucracies. Very little attention is paid to the role of external and 
international actors and the lack of transparency that shroud the 
extent of their involvement in these conflicts and violence. They all 
cooperate in tandem. Ken Saro-Wiwa called it the “slick alliance” 
(Bassey, 2008, p.11). The benefits of disaster capitalism that accrue 
to oil companies are considerable. They operate behind the military 
shield of state; they refuse to pay adequate taxes unless publicly 
pressured; they bribe Nigerian officials. A case in point is Wilbros 
Group which pleaded guilty to bribing government officials with 
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more than $6million in June 2007 while hiding behind the 
government programme of fighting corruption. They declare oil 
spillages to be the result of sabotage in order to avoid cost of clean-
up and paying compensation (2008, p.12). The point being made 
here is that people must try to understand that violence in the Niger 
Delta is a boon for the merchants of disaster capitalism. The gun 
runners, the kidnappers, the ballot thieves, and the oil thieves differ 
very little. For Chimamanda Adichie, (2008, p. 103) the Niger Delta 
injustices will end when we have at the helm of affairs, people who 
are honest, tough and forthright with the political will to do the right 
things. 
  Nollywood’s Niger Delta Ethnic Nationalism film genre has 
evolved around the historical antecedents of the region. One of the 
major characteristics which film theorists and critics recognize 
about film genre is the fact that the stories are really there and are 
known by the people. The events are historical, sociological, 
cultural, political and topical encounters negotiated within and 
amongst the people. These encounters and negotiations have in turn 
given birth to a class of films referred to as ethnic nationalism films 
which have become a genre of its own within Nollywood film 
culture.  
 
The Concept of Nationalism and the Cinema 
Nationhood is always an image constructed under particular 
conditions, and nationalism itself, as a concept in modern sense can 
only be traced to the late 18th century. It is therefore the necessary 
basis of the national narrative (Higson, 2002, p.62). Ethnic 
nationalism is a complex social phenomenon. It may be looked at in 
terms of beliefs about the superiority and differences of one’s ethnic 
group and defense of its interests above others. There is always a 




tendency for ethnic or linguistic groups to fight for recognition of 
their own identity. The Nigerian experience with pronounced ethnic 
nationalism is not particularly a strange phenomenon. In practical 
terms an ethnic nationalist identifies with and sees himself first, as 
a member of a particular ethnic nationality, before identifying 
himself with a nation. This helps to explain the emergence and 
proliferation of ethnic associations and militias in Nigeria, such as 
Yoruba Council of Elders (YCE), Odua People’s Congress (OPC), 
Arewa People’s Congress (APC), Arewa Consultative Forum 
(ACF), Ohaneze Ndigbo, Egbesu Boys, Bakassi Boys, Middle Belt 
Forum (MBF), Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), South-south People’s Conference, Union of Niger 
Deltans, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
(MEND).  
Higson quotes Heath as suggesting that “nationhood is not a 
given, it is always something to be ‘gained’ (as cited in Williams, 
2002, pp.62-63), and cinema needs to be understood as one of the 
means by which it is gained. Therefore, the definition of any nation’s 
cinema would always involve the construction of what has been 
referred to as “an imaginary homogeneity” of identity and culture of 
that nation (Williams, 2002, p.2). Thus, the definition of Nigerian 
cinema (Nollywood), for instance, or Niger Delta ethnic 
Nationalism film genre, will involve, on the one hand, the 
construction of an imaginary homogeneity of identity and culture, 
an already achieved national or regional identity, apparently shared 
by all Nigerians or all Niger Deltans; or on the other hand, the 
valorisation of a very particular conception of Nollywood cinema, 
which involves ignoring whole areas of the nation’s history. In each 
case a process of inclusion and exclusion is enacted, a process 
whereby one thing is centralized, at the same time necessarily 
marginalizing another, a process wherein the interests of one 
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particular social group are represented as the collective or national 
interest, producing what Andrew Higson has called the “imagined 
community of the nation” (2002, p.63). 
 
National Cinema 
Rosen observes that “identifying the coherence of a national cinema 
will always require sensitivity to the countervailing, dispersive 
forces underlying them” (as cited in Williams, 2002, p.41). The 
nation can subsume into a fictional identity all manner of 
differences, across axes of class, gender, ethnicity, culture and so 
on. Discourses of national cinema reception tend to effect similar 
homogenization. Reductive national cultural symbolization crowed 
out more complex articulations of national identity. This tendency 
is challenged only at limit-case points where a politicized cinema 
explores differences of class, gender, ethnicity and region (Crofts, 
2002, p.42). 
In Film and Nationalism, Stephen Crofts seeks to enable a 
consideration of national cinema outside the first world terms. 
According to him, to achieve this necessitates acknowledging a 
wider range of national cinemas than is regularly treated under the 
rubric. The world views of different national film cultures are 
substantially informed by their country’s relations – military, 
economic, diplomatic, cultural, and ethnic – with other parts of the 
globe (2002, p.42). Recent instances of assertion of ethnicity centre 
on linguistic rights and cultural protection. Minorities or majorities 
defined by political dissent, class, ethnicity, gender, religion, or 
region are the everyday stuff of many people’s lives. Politics is a 
matter of unequal distribution of power across axes of nation as well 
as class, ethnicity and region. The political engagements of people 
vary with their social and political contexts, and their readings of 




those contexts. In considering national cinema, this implies the 
importance of a political flexibility able, in some contexts, to 
challenge the fictional homogenizations of much of discourse on 
national cinema, and in others to support them (Higson, 2002, p.62). 
What is suggested here is the importance of acknowledging the 
continuing power of the nation-state. To acknowledge these powers 
is not to disavow the cultural hybridity of nation-states, nor to 
unconditionally promote national identities over those of ethnicity, 
class, gender, region and other axes of social division which 
contribute to those identities; nor to buy into originary fantasies of 
irrecoverable cultural roots, or into the unitary, teleological fantasies 
in which nationalisms display themselves (Crofts, 2002, p.44).  
The struggle of many national cinemas has been one for 
cultural and economic self-definition against Hollywood and 
Bollywood. While cultural specificity is not defined exclusively by 
boundaries of political construct, the nation-state, at certain 
historical moments, often moments when nationalism connects 
closely with genuinely populist movement, often nation building 
moments, national developments can occasion specifically national 
filmic manifestation which can claim a cultural authenticity or 
rootedness. Examples include some of the best known cinema 
“movements”: Italian Neo-Realism, Latin American Third Cinema, 
and Fifth Generation Chinese Cinema all of which arose on the crest 
of waves of national popular resurgence. The French Nouvelle 
Vague (New Wave), a national intellectual-cultural recovery in the 
making since the late 1940s; New German Cinema drew much of its 
strength from a 1960 – 1970s student audience and an allied concern 
to make sense of the traumas of recent German history. The 
Australian feature film revival took off on a surge of cultural 
nationalism developing through the 1960s (Crofts, 2002, p.45). To 
the above one may add Nollywood, which emerged at a period of 
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struggle for economic and political survival; and the Niger Delta 
ethnic nationalism genre, which rode on the crest of regional 
resistance and militancy. Such cinema movements occupy key 
positions in conventional histories of world cinema, whose 
historiography is not only nationalist but also elitist.  
In the context of the relations of unequal economic and 
cultural exchange obtaining between Hollywood and other national 
cinemas, the generation and survival of indigenous genres is a gauge 
of the strength and dynamism of a national cinema. Outstanding 
instances in non-Hollywood post1945 cinema would be the Hong 
Kong martial arts film, the French (stylish) thriller of Chabrol, and 
the British Gothic horror films and Ealing comedy (Crofts, 2002, 
p.46). A vital research concerns the intersection between given 
genres and the national. A range of questions present themselves. 
For example: Under what conditions do cultural specific genres 
arise? How do imported genres affect the generic range of a given 
national production sector? Does Nollywood even have genres? 
Crofts suggests the inappropriateness of theorizing 
differences of nations and national cinemas of the “exclusionary 
imperialist” ideologies of self and other. He maintains that national 
cinematic self-definition, like national self-definition, likes to pride 
itself on its distinctiveness, and its standing apart from others. Such 
a transcendental concept of an ego repressing its others urges 
abandonment of the self/other model as adequate means of thinking 
national cinema. This dualist model authorizes only two political 
stances: imperial aggression and defiant national chauvinism. It can 
account neither for Third Cinema’s move beyond what Solanas calls 
its “experimental” phase, nor for the existence of such projects as 
those of “Imitating Hollywood.”   Still less can it make sense of the 
hybridity of national cultures (2002, p.46). 




In Andrew Higson’s opinion, “to identify a national cinema 
is first to specify a coherence and a unity; it is to proclaim a unique 
identity and a stable set of meanings” (2002, p.54). The process of 
identification is thus invariably a hegemonizing, mythologizing 
process, involving both the production and assignation of a 
particular set of meanings, and attempt to contain, or prevent the 
potential proliferation of other meanings. At the same time, the 
concept of a national cinema has almost invariably been mobilized 
as a strategy of cultural and economic resistance: a means of 
asserting national autonomy in the face of international domination. 
Higson argues further that the process of national mythmaking is not 
simply an insidious or celebratory work of ideological production, 
but it is also a means of setting one body of images and values 
against another, which may threaten to overwhelm the first.  
The search for a unique and stable identity, the assertion of 
national specificity does then have some meaning, some usefulness. 
Its histories can really be understood as histories of crisis and 
conflict, of resistance and negotiation. He identifies two central 
methods, conceptually, of establishing or identifying the imaginary 
coherence, the specificity of a national cinema: a) the method of 
comparing and contrasting one cinema to another, thereby 
establishing varying degrees of otherness; b) an inward looking 
process, exploring the cinema of a nation in relation to other already 
existing economies and cultures of that nation-state (2002, p.55). 
The first of these means of defining a national cinema is premised 
upon the semiotic principle of the production of meaning and 
identity through difference. The task is to try to establish the identity 
of one national cinema by its relationship to and differentiation from 
other national cinemas.  
To some extent then, the process of defining a national 
cinema, and thereby establishing some sort of unique and self-
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contained identity, takes meaning in the context of a conceptual play 
of differences and identities. In other words, while it is conceptually 
useful to isolate a single national cinema, it is necessary also that it 
is seen in relation to other cinemas. The same is true when 
examining cultural identity of a particular national cinema. The 
areas that need to be examined are, first, the context or subject 
matter of a particular body of films – that which is represented, the 
dominant narrative discoveries and dramatic themes, and the 
narrative traditions and other source materials on which they draw 
(particularly the degree to which they draw on what has been 
constructed as the national heritage, literary, theatrical or 
otherwise); in other words, the ways in which cinema inserts itself 
alongside other cultural practices, and the ways in which it draws on 
the existing cultural histories and cultural traditions of the producing 
nation, reformulating them in cinematic terms, appropriating them 
to build up its own generic conventions. Second, there is the 
question of the sensibility or structure of feeling, or world-view 
expressed in those films.  
Thirdly, there is the area of the style of those films, their 
formal systems of representation, the forms of narration and 
motivation, which they employ, their construction of space and 
staging action, the structuring of narrative and time, the modes of 
performance they employ, the types of visual pleasure, spectacle and 
display which they engage, and their modes of address and 
construction of subjectivity, particularly, the degree to which they 
engage in the construction of fantasy and the regulation of audience 
knowledge (Higson, 2002, p.62). 
The Concept of Film Genres 
A derivation from the French language, the word genre means type, 
sort, kind, category, field or variety. One of the categories, based on 




form, style, or subject matter into which artistic works of all kinds can 
be divided. Ayakoroma (2007, p.6) uses the term genre within the 
context of a “…division of works into different recognizable groups 
which are bound in by certain distinguishing traits aimed at helping an 
audience’s understanding and appreciation of such works.” The word 
genre is not exclusive to the study of filmic expression – art, literature, 
music, media, design, drama and, in recent studies, fashion benefit 
from the application of the term with a view to properly appreciating 
the aesthetics of that art form.  The main purpose in defining a genre is 
to establish a context for the approach to an individual work (Yacowar, 
2008, pp.276 – 295).  
  Judith Hess Wright opines that genre films came into being 
and were successful financially because they temporarily relieved the 
fears aroused by recognition of social and political conflicts; they 
helped to discourage any action that might otherwise follow upon the 
pressure generated by living with these conflicts. They serve the 
interest of the ruling class by assisting in the maintenance of the status 
quo, and they throw a sop to oppressed groups who, because they are 
unorganized and therefore afraid to act, eagerly accept the genre film’s 
absurd solution to economic and social conflicts. In her view, the 
popularity of the genre film resides in the manipulation of the fears and 
anxiety of the masses to provide easy comfort and solace to economic 
and social situations that would otherwise overwhelm us and possibly 
push the masses to action. In other words, genre films are tools in the 
hands of the ruling class for the maintenance of the status quo (Wright, 
pp.42 – 50).    
 Liquid Black Gold (Aniekwe, 2008) and Genesis (Inojie, 
2008) might serve as examples of films illuminated by the sense of 
ethnicity and ethnic nationalism in the Niger Delta. But in these 
films we see a different climate than the historical antecedents of the 
region. Whereas the history points to a call for a revolution; a change 
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in the social, economic and political structure (in short a 
fundamentally radical change), but the films appear to advocate for 
only fair treatment within the same social, economic and political 
structure, thus confirming the views of Judith Hess Wright. It is not 
clear whether this is due to the demands of the regulatory body for 
these films or that the apparent messages of the films are as given 
by the filmmakers.  
 Yet, considering the many ‘dust’ that are thrown up in the 
course of the thematic, narrative and structural development of the 
films, it is difficult to reconcile the seemingly manipulative 
resolutions at the end with the issues raised, especially when such 
issues are still contemporary and relevant issues. Unlike the 
American western genre which is usually set in the past and 
therefore can be considered to be a romantic and nostalgic longing 
for the ‘good old days’, Nollywood’s Niger Delta ethnic nationalism 
film genre deals with issues of the present which have historical 
antecedents. They are not matters of some primitive tribes struggling 
against civilization. Like a character from Liquid Black Gold says, 
“We fight just to stay alive: We fight in order to live.” This fight has 
been ongoing right from slavery, to legitimate trade, to colonization, 
down to amalgamation and finally independence.  
 Considering the socioeconomic cum political climate, it 
appears that the conclusions of the films have not reflected the true 
image and feelings or even mood of the moment. Genesis ends with 
Kio (Gentle Jack) leading his gang to surrender their arms to the 
state, and he is appointed chairman of a committee that will oversee 
developmental projects in the community. To drive the point home, 
the film goes on to roll out shots of such developmental projects 
being carried out in the rural communities. This gives a picture of 
hope. In Liquid Black Gold, the two rival gangs surrender their arms 




to government and promise to work with the Chief for the 
development of the community – another message of hope. In 
Amnesty (Aniekwe, 2010), government again extends the olive 
branch which the antagonist quickly grabs for selfish advancement. 
But again the social order is maintained; Tekina (Van Vicker) is 




Genre Evolution in Nollywood  
Production of films in Nollywood is basically characterized by a 
band-wagon syndrome. This is not unconnected with the very 
manner the industry itself began with the commercial success of Vic 
Mordi’s Living in Bondage (1992) and its sequel, Living in Bondage 
II (Christian Onu, 1992). Okechukwu Ogunjiofor’s Circle of Doom 
(1993) also came in two parts, shot in Igbo language and subtitled 
in English. As if this was a confirmation of the viability of the new 
trend, it was to mark the emergence of what Shaka (2002) refers to 
as “genre oriented productions.” According to Shaka, the ‘ritual 
videos’ received a negative reaction from the public even where the 
producers raked in their commercial gains to embark on more 
ambitious productions, and, thus the emergence of another genre 
“the epic videos” (Shaka, 2002, pp. 58-59). Shaka also opines that 
Nollywood genres (Niger Delta subgenre inclusive) do not emerge 
from a vacuum. Their roots can be traced to social anxieties and 
fears, dreams, aspirations, demands of members of the Nigerian 
state and the response of the state to these demands. And since 
Nigeria is a vast country made up of about 390 ethnic nationalities 
(Babangida, 2003), with their peculiar competing political, socio-
cultural and economic aspirations, there will always be plenty of 
  Oil Politics and Niger Delta Ethnic Nationalism Film Genre in Nollywood 





stories to tell and Niger Delta proves to be a fertile region for 
spawning such stories. 
Emergence of Niger Delta Ethnic Nationalism Film Genre 
Genres are not the specific creation of any individual persons, script 
writer, producer director, scholar or critic working within the film 
industry (Ayakorama, 2008, p.109). They evolve at a particular 
point in the history of an emergent film industry as a result of several 
factors, including the viewing interest of the audience, prevailing 
socio-economic conditions and political climate as well as market 
forces which drive the industry. Looking at trends of genre evolution 
in Nollywood, starting from the blockbuster that opened the 
floodgates of Nollywood film industry, several factors can be said 
to account for the emergence of the Niger Delta ethnic nationalism 
film genre.  
First is the fact that within Nollywood, there are Nollywood 
sub-film cultures which have developed along ethnic or regional 
lines. For example, we have the Hausa film, Yoruba film and Igbo 
films. Apart from language serving as delineating factor in 
categorizing these sub cultural film genres within Nollywood, these 
regional films tell the stories of the experiences of their people: 
political experiences, historical, economic, social and cultural 
experiences. It is only reasonable that a sense of ethnic pride and 
solidarity could have also encouraged the crop of artists from the 
Niger Delta who, after all, have as much rich material, if not even 
more than the other regions, and more relevant stories, to borrow a 
leaf from their colleagues. So each region or ethnic group tend to 
see the film medium as an effective medium for projecting the image 
of their people and for making statements that border on affairs of 
the Nigerian state. The film medium provides a platform for such 




statements to be made without having to face litigation or be 
hounded. Secondly, the trend of evolution of other genre films can 
also be considered a factor in triggering the evolution of the Niger 
Delta ethnic nationalism genre. A third factor could be the diffusion 
of ideas from film stars.  
Looking at the Issakaba series which evolved from the social 
climate of Aba, Abia State some years back, one cannot help but 
notice the dominant star actors of the Issakaba series also 
dominating in the Niger delta ethnic nationalism genre. It can be 
argued that from playing roles that portrayed the social climate of 
other regions, a conscious awakening of the prevailing 
circumstances in their own region was triggered. Another factor is 
the rise of a crop of writers, actors/actresses, directors, etc., from the 
Niger Delta who see an opportunity in the film industry as both a 
profitable commercial enterprise and an instrument of mass 
mobilization and social consciousness. Like the rise of Nollywood 
itself, the emergence of Niger Delta film genre provided job 
opportunities and meaningful livelihood for thousands of people 
who would otherwise be in the creeks trying to catch fish in waters 
barren of fish from oil pollution, or engaged in one illegal activity 
or the other. Packaging the abundant social, economic, political and 
cultural and historical experiences of the region as both 
entertainment and escapism for the people, and protest against 
marginalization and injustice proves to be a constructive, creative 
and innovation way of grabbing both local attention from state and 
federal government, as well as the international communities. 
 Furthermore, Niger Delta ethnic nationalism film genre 
evolved at a time when the Nigerian audience taste had also 
undergone some aesthetic evolution. The average viewer had started 
to complain about the monotony of film/story recycling. The 
excitement of the decade of Living in Bondage, Taboo, Nneka: The 
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Pretty Serpent, etc., was over. Viewers wanted more challenging 
viewing experience than those offered by recycling rituals, epics, 
romance, etc. The Niger Delta film became another genre that the 
viewing public could identify with because they were familiar with 
the real events and the topical issues that gave birth to the films.  
The stories were there screaming from front pages and 
headlines of newspapers and magazines; they were there right in the 
living rooms on television; these were lived experiences, especially 
for those resident in the Niger Delta. Those people who were 
resident within the region could readily confirm that the cameras 
captured or reenacted the actual lived experiences of the people, 
especially during the turbulent years of incessant shootings and 
kidnappings. For those living outside the region, who only read from 
papers and viewed from televisions, the Niger Delta ethnic 
nationalism films came as authentic confirmation of all that were 
reported. These Niger Delta ethnic nationalism films have provided 
both entertainment and food for thought in the collective psyche of 
the Nigerian nation. 
The Niger Delta ethnic nationalism genre of Nollywood film 
culture has evolved from a long history of social, cultural, economic 
subjugation, marginalization and denigration of the people. Perhaps, 
this genre of video films has done more to call attention to the 
agitations of the people than arm struggles and confrontations have 
been able to do. The Niger Delta ethnic nationality filmmakers have, 
through the use of the film medium, brought to the fore the 
atrocities, the ills and the unfairness of the whole situation into the 
living rooms of many stalwarts who had hitherto locked themselves 
up in their fortified mansions; caring nothing about the demands of 
restive youths and issuing orders to have them all arrested and 
exterminated. The wicked businessman who uses the youths to 




destroy social infrastructure so that his business would flourish (like 
Alhaji Gambo in Amnesty); the arm dealer who supplies the 
weapons of destruction to rival militant groups while laughing to the 
banks (as in Liquid Black Gold); the community Chiefs who receive 
bribes from oil companies and government officials and betray the 
trust of their people (as in Genesis); the futility and stupidity of rival 
youth gangs who fight one and another, killing their parents, 
brothers and raping their sisters, while the real enemies of the people 
enjoy booties they neither worked nor fought for; all these are 
graphically brought into the living rooms to the rude shock and 
awakening of many. 
 At the beginning, the funding of Nollywood was in the hands 
of Igbo traders at Lagos, Onitsha and Aba. Being shrewd and astute 
businessmen, they were more interested in maximizing profit than 
in the quality of the productions, or even taking into consideration 
the theories of film production. As trained actors and academics 
began to get involved in the industry, egos began to clash. The Igbo 
traders had the financial ego and muscles while the professionals 
had the fine features of professional film making. While the 
financiers wanted their quick turnover and profit, the professionals 
wanted excellence; but they had to accept the decisions of the 
funders while they had no funds. With time some of the 
professionals who had hitherto acted and collected their professional 
fees became financially solvent enough to sponsor their own 
productions. This also partly accounts for the rise of the Niger Delta 
genre. The availability of funds from acting fees had put some of the 
Niger Delta actors in a position to tell their own stories from their 
own point of view; the way they wanted to tell it. 
 A few Chiefs and opinion leaders within the communities 
are bribed to help perpetuate the injustices and in subjugation of 
their own people. The principle of divide and rule has always been 
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the policy of all oppressive people. The British introduced it into 
Nigeria, and Nigerians have so far perfected it far beyond the 
intentions and imaginations of the whites who were the original 
inventors. Perhaps, while the motivating factor for the white man in 
his policy of divide and rule was disdain for the ‘primitive tribes’ 
and convenience for his administrators, the motivating factors for 
the despotic and autocratic rulers of today may well be greed, 
opportunity to take vengeance on rival families and ‘I pass my 
neighbour’ mentality. These socio-economic cum political 
situations have been contributory factors to the emergence of the 
militancy genre in Nollywood film culture.  
Amnesty 1&2 makes a powerful statement to the effect that 
the problem of the nation is actually fuelled by cabals who are close 
to the corridors of power; individuals and groups trusted by 
government, but they frustrate the efforts of government 
clandestinely in order to serve their selfish interests. Apart from 
using the unemployed youths and capitalizing on hunger and 
poverty, they also use the instrument of misinformation to peddle 
false rumours while sitting back to sadistically watch the President 
worry, fret and rage over restive youths who are the creations of 
some official and unofficial members of the presidential cabinet. 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at oil politics being played out in the Niger 
Delta, we noted that the youth restiveness and militancy in the Niger 
Delta resulted from a combination of a number of factors, including 
marginalization of the youths of the region from all quarters 
(government, oil companies, local Chiefs, corrupt officers of 
multinational corporations, etc.), and insensitivity of government 
and multinational oil companies in their dealings with local 




communities. Added to these factors are injustices and inequalities 
occasioned by institutionalized corruption.   
The drama of hostilities in 21st century Niger Delta is a 
replay of the same drama played out in the 19th century with the 
British traders encouraging intercommunity hostilities, frustrating 
every effort at peaceful resolution of conflicts and generally raking 
in profits while brothers killed brothers and kinsmen turned against 
kinsmen. Alagoa and Fombo in Chronicle of Grand Bonny, indict 
the British for the role they played in fuelling hostilities and 
frustrating peaceful resolutions: “Efforts to make were frustrated by 
British traders, who persuaded Jaja not to yield to arbitration…” 
(2008, p. 31). The British supplied the warring factions with arms 
and ammunitions much the same way that those who benefit from 
the hostilities in contemporary Niger Delta region supply them with 
arms and ammunitions. In the Liquid Black Gold, we see the 
Ogbuefis, the Alhajis and the private foreign exploiters play the 
same roles of supplying arms and ammunition to the warring 
factions. The films discussed include the Genesis and Liquid Black 
Gold and the Amnesty series which explored the gradual process by 
which brilliant law abiding young men are pushed by a corrupt 
system into militancy.  
The video films give insight into the major grievances of the 
poor masses of the Niger Delta region, where the youths are side-
stepped by corrupt and conniving Chiefs to impoverish the land 
while the youths remain jobless and poor. Ethnic nationalism 
sentiment is strong and widespread among the youths of the Niger 
Delta. They believe that with self-determination and resource 
control of the region, their deplorable condition will change. Yet, 
rivalry and dissention polarize them such that the powers that be 
break their ranks by the trickery of divide and rule. Though in the 
Niger Delta ethnic nationalism film genre, we see and even accept 
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simplistic resolutions of the conflicts, the realities on ground are far 
from what the films portray and the way the issues of conflict are 
resolved. It is obvious that these simplistic resolutions represent the 
desires and fantasies of the society. Considering the historical 
antecedents of the region, a more meaningful commitment on the 
part of government needs to be made towards addressing the burning 
issues raised in the region to avoid a repeat of history which might 
provide more raw materials for another cycle of films that might tell 
worse stories than have already been told. 
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